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Offshore Accounts 
Jane G. Song∗  
Abstract: The closing of Switzerland’s oldest bank Wegelin in early 2013 was a 
symbolic moment for the Swiss banking industry. Add to Wegelin fourteen other 
Swiss banks under fire by the U.S. Department of Justice for aiding tax evasion, 
and Swiss banks no longer seem to be shrouded in a cloak of mystery. While 
Switzerland is still the top destination for offshore wealth, U.S.’s Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) began implementation in 2014. This 
Comment will argue that FATCA will fundamentally alter Switzerland’s status 
as a safe haven for secret offshore accounts, as Swiss banks promise to 
automatically provide the U.S. government with account information, and 
cooperate with other international transparency measures picking up momentum 
alongside FATCA. This Comment will also analyze FATCA’s impact on 
Switzerland’s banking policies regarding the transparency of offshore accounts 
used for foreign tax evasion and conclude by posing questions about the future 
of Swiss banking industry. 
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In the film The World Is Not Enough, James Bond asks, “If you can’t 
trust a Swiss banker, what’s the world come to?”1 We may have taken for 
granted that few, if any, illicit transactions that Bond dashed after would 
have existed without the help of Swiss bankers shuttling money around in 
secret accounts. But the question that has recently come up is exactly that: 
what if you can no longer trust a Swiss banker? The closing of 
Switzerland’s oldest bank Wegelin in early 2013 was a symbolic moment 
for the Swiss banking industry. A famed institution with 270 years of 
history shuttered its doors within one year after being indicted by the U.S. 
government for helping U.S. citizens avoid $1.2 billion in taxes through 
offshore accounts.2 Add to Wegelin fourteen other Swiss banks under fire 
by U.S. Department of Justice for aiding tax evasion,3 and Swiss banks no 
longer seem to be shrouded in a cloak of mystery.4  
Yet the real dagger aimed for the heart of Swiss secret banking has just 
been thrown. Although Switzerland is still the top destination for $8.5 
trillion of offshore wealth, managing $2.2 trillion in 2012,5 U.S.’s Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) began implementation in 2014.6 In 
this Comment, I will argue that FATCA will fundamentally alter 
Switzerland’s status as a safe haven for secret offshore accounts, as Swiss 
banks promise to automatically provide the U.S. government with account 
information, and cooperate with other international transparency measures 
picking up momentum alongside FATCA. 
This Comment will analyze FATCA’s impact on Switzerland’s 
banking policies regarding the transparency of offshore accounts used for 
foreign tax evasion. Part II will give the background on history of Swiss 
banking secrecy, U.S.-Swiss policies on secret banking, and major events 
that led up to the enactment of FATCA. Part III will explain the key 
provisions of FATCA, the two types of FATCA Intergovernmental 
 
 1  THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MGM Studios 1999). 
 2  See Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea, 
REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-swissbank-wegelin-
idUSBRE9020O020130104. 
 3  See David Voreacos, Secret Swiss Accounts Said No Longer Safe for Tax Dodging, BLOOMBERG, 
Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-08/secret-swiss-accounts-said-no-longer-safe-
for-tax-dodging.html.  
 4  See Offshore Tax Evasion: Swiss Finished?, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 7, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21585009-america-arm-twists-bulk-
switzerlands-banks-painful-deal-swiss (recent events have “fuel[ed] speculation that Switzerland could 
lose its crown as the leading offshore financial centre”). 
 5  BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, GLOBAL WEALTH 2013: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN A COMPLEX 
WORLD 11 (2013), available at https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/Maintaining_Momentum_ 
Complex_World_May_2013_tcm80-135355.pdf. 
 6  See 2014-33 I.R.B. 1033, 1034 (2014). 
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Agreements, and the mechanics of the 2013 U.S.-Switzerland 
Implementation Agreement (U.S.-Swiss Agreement). Part IV will illustrate 
how the current semi-automatic information exchange provision in the 
U.S.-Swiss Agreement is a huge shift from previous Swiss information 
exchange policies, and discuss how it will fundamentally change the Swiss 
banking landscape. I will show that Switzerland is significantly affected by 
its proactive efforts to comply with FATCA, which in turn challenges the 
economics of the Swiss banking industry, in particular the nature of 
Switzerland’s private banking business. Part V will then further assess how 
FATCA’s impact on Switzerland is in line with recent international trends 
for greater cross-border financial transparency. I will conclude by posing 
questions about the future of Swiss banking industry. 
 I. SWISS SECRET BANKING POLICIES AND EVENTS LEADING 
UP TO FATCA 
Over the past century, Switzerland has developed a reputation for a 
secret banking system that affords the ultimate privacy and protection for its 
clients.7 Switzerland has become the ideal destination for tax evaders as a 
depository of more than 25% of the world’s offshore wealth in 2012.8 
Meanwhile, it has been estimated that individual tax evasion has cost the 
U.S. government as much as $100 billion.9 In this section, I will describe 
how Switzerland’s secret banking business, U.S. policies against secret 
banking, various U.S.-Switzerland tax agreements, and the 2008 UBS tax 
evasion scandal have set the stage for the passage of FATCA and U.S.’s 
crackdown on tax evasion through secret Swiss accounts. 
 A. Swiss Banking Secrecy 
Switzerland developed its financial and banking industry by 
responding to Europe’s market needs after the World Wars. When many 
countries experienced hyperinflation and exchange controls after World 
War I, wealthy Europeans began investing their assets in more stable 
countries including Switzerland.10 Swiss banks captured the market share of 
individuals who wanted to hide their assets from government investigation 
and feared the loss of their savings due to the instability in their home 
 
 7  See Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank Secrecy with Comparative Aspects to the American 
Approach, 42 ST. LOUIS L.J. 865, 866 (1998); W. BLACKMAN, SWISS BANKING IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 18 (1989).  
 8  BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 5, at 11.  
 9  See JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 23-4 (2013). 
 10  BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
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countries.11 By the end of Second World War, Switzerland had replaced 
Brussels in its status as a leading banking hub.12  
 Yet it was the Swiss Banking Act that took Switzerland’s banking 
reputation to the next level. Despite their early twentieth century success, 
Swiss banks had to face the regulations of the Nazi government, which 
enacted legislation in 1933 requiring citizens of the Nazi regime to declare 
all of their foreign assets.13 So the Swiss Parliament in 1934 passed the 
Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks (Swiss Banking Act), Article 47 
of which established a code of secrecy for banking and account 
information.14 It created the concept of banker-client privilege, akin to 
lawyer-client privilege, that provided the utmost privacy to bank clients.15 
The Swiss Banking Act sought to protect Switzerland’s economic 
sovereignty in its banking system, and prevent individuals and other entities 
from divulging financial information to foreign governments.16  
Under the current Swiss law, banking secrecy is protected under both 
civil and criminal codes.17 Civil law on bank secrecy exists in the Swiss 
Civil Code and the Code of Obligation. Article 28(l) of the Swiss Civil 
Code provides that a customer can petition a judge to bar a bank from 
releasing private information.18 Article 27 of the Swiss Code of Obligation 
gives a customer a cause of action against a bank for damages for violation 
of secrecy and disclosure of private information.19 The Swiss Penal Code 
complements the civil law by providing that bankers face criminal 
 
 11  See DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 664 (1992); BLACKMAN, supra note 7, 
at 18; EDOUARD CHAMBOST, BANK ACCOUNTS: A WORLD GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY 6–7 (1983). 




 13  See CHAMBOST, supra note 11, at 5.  
 14  See BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL ACT ON BANKS 
AND SAVINGS BANKS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.) [hereinafter FEDERAL ACT ON BANKS 
AND SAVINGS BANKS], available at http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19340083/ 
201301010000/952.0.pdf. 
 15  See id. art. 47 (providing that any person who in his capacity as a body, employee, appointee or 
liquidator of a bank, or employee of an auditing firm, attempts to induce an infraction of the professional 
secrecy, is subject to imprisonment or fine).  
 16  See CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 664. Under Nazi laws, failure to report foreign holdings carried 
the death penalty. See Bernhard F. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the U.S., 
14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 26 (1979). Thus Switzerland felt an economic as well as political impetus to 
enact banking law to protect itself from a serious threat to privacy. Id.  
 17  See ROSE-MARIE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 24 (2002).  
 18  See SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art 28(1) 
(Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS CIVIL CODE].  
 19  See SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 
220, art. 27 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS]. These policies for banking secrecy is 
derived from contractual and agency principles. See CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 664.  
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prosecution if they divulge confidential information about their customers.20 
Swiss Penal Code Article 271 prohibits financial institutions from acting on 
behalf of a foreign government, and Article 273 makes it a crime for a 
person to divulge secret business information to a foreign government 
authority.21 Thus, this multi-layered legal protection of banking secrecy 
fostered an environment for Switzerland to attract customers and flourish as 
the most competitive wealth management center in the world.22 
Unsurprisingly, Switzerland also became an attractive destination for U.S. 
persons seeking to benefit from Swiss bank secrecy laws.23  
 B. U.S.-Swiss Policies on Secret Banking and Tax Avoidance Prior 
to FATCA 
While Swiss banks have faced no domestic civil or criminal liability 
when assisting international clients shelter assets in Switzerland, they have 
been subject to risk of liability and scrutiny by foreign governments, 
including the U.S.24 Thus over the past fifty years, U.S. and Switzerland 
entered into a number of agreements regarding bank secrecy and tax 
avoidance.  
To begin, the U.S. legal system generally views foreign bank secrecy 
laws as promoting and facilitating illegal activity, and prosecutors have 
attempted to enforce its national laws regardless of their possible effect on 
foreign laws.25 While U.S. law recognizes that bankers owe a duty to not 
disclose customer information to a third party, it does not recognize that 
 
 20  See SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, arts. 
271 & 273 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS PENAL CODE]. The Swiss Penal Code instituted criminal 
penalties for violation of the 1934 Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks. See CAMPBELL, supra note 
11, at 667–68. 
 21  See SWISS PENAL CODE.  
 22  See DELOITTE CONSULTING AG, THE DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTRE RANKING 
2013: MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN 
SWITZERLAND 2 (2013), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Switzerland/ 
Local%20Assets/Documents/EN/Survey/Wealth%20management/2013/ch_en_Deloitte_International_
Wealth_Management_Centre_Rankings_2013.pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
CENTER RANKING 2013]. In Deloitte’s study, Switzerland came up on top when evaluated on a range of 
47 successive indicators grouped into four areas of business environment, provider capability, stability, 
and tax and regulatory factors. Id. 
 23  See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 69. 
 24  For example, Swiss banks were attacked for receiving Nazi-looted assets during the Second 
World War, and denying access to family accounts for descendents of Holocaust victims. See The 
Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 1–2 (1996) (statement of Rep. 
Leach, Chairman, H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.). The descendents brought suits against Swiss 
banks in U.S. courts, and some of the claims have settled. See David E. Sanger, Swiss Banks Make Offer 
on Nazi Loot, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/20/world/swiss-banks-
make-offer-on-nazi-loot.html. 
 25  See Lauchli, supra note 7, at 878–79. 
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privilege when it comes to government inquiries.26 In 1970, in response to 
findings that secret bank accounts have been utilized by Americans to evade 
income taxes and conceal assets,27 Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA) to provide the IRS with access to bank records and facilitate criminal 
and tax investigations for money laundering.28  
Since then, the U.S. has engaged in a number of tax agreements with 
Switzerland, principally to avoid international double taxation and prevent 
tax avoidance and evasion.29 Like the U.S., Switzerland enters into tax 
treaties with other nations to eliminate barriers against cross-border 
economic transactions.30 Tax agreements are critical because the U.S. is a 
key economic partner for Switzerland.31 The next paragraphs provide an 
overview of the U.S.-Swiss tax agreements that were signed prior to 
FATCA.  
U.S. and Switzerland first entered into a tax treaty in 1951 (now 
replaced by the 1996 Treaty),32 focused on administrative assistance for 
eliminating double taxation of income.33 The treaty lacked any real bite on 
tax avoidance; Switzerland agreed to exchange information only in criminal 
cases involving “tax fraud,”34 a criminal offense narrowly defined under 
Swiss law.35 Also, the Swiss authorities were not required to provide the 
 
 26  See id. at 877. 
 27  See Foreign Bank Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the H. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 8 (1969–1970). 
 28  See Financial Recordkeeping and Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 
91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1829(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–
1959, and at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 5316–5325 (1994)). 
 29  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO 
THE INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND (JCX-32-11) 6 (Comm. 
Print 2011) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF 2009 PROTOCOL], available at https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3791.  
 30  Switzerland’s Double Treaties, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/ch/en/topics/saving-
tax/pages/dba.aspx (last updated Nov. 2014). 
 31  For a discussion of the importance of the U.S. market to Switzerland, particularly in context of 
Swiss banks, see infra notes 153–158. 
 32  See Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 
1751, repealed by Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-8 [hereinafter 1951 Treaty].  
 33  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 2388 (Comm. Print 1962). The 1951 Treaty did not target tax 
avoidance; it sought to eliminate double taxation by exemption in one of the countries or by applying 
credit. Id. U.S. already had similar conventions in force with Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the U.K. Id. 
 34  See 1951 Convention, supra note 32, art. XVI(1).  
 35  See BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS VERWALTUNGSSTRAFRECHT [VSTRR] [CRIMINAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] March 22, 1974, SR 313.0, art. 14(2) (Switz.). According to a long line of Swiss 
Supreme Court cases, tax fraud refers to tax avoidance of a significant amount when the taxpayer uses 
forged or fortified documents or adopts fraudulent conduct to deceive the tax administration. XAVIER 
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United States with the proof of the fraud for further U.S. proceedings.36  
Thus, the first major U.S.-Swiss cooperation effort took place in 1973, 
when the two countries agreed to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (Swiss 
MLAT) to combat organized crime.37 But because the Swiss MLAT was 
ineffective for tax-related matters,38 the two countries signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (Swiss MOU) in 1982 for cooperation on 
insider trading investigations.39 Switzerland pledged assistance by outlining 
specific procedures for collecting and transmitting information to the 
United States.40  
The 1951 Treaty has been updated a number of times since its 
inception, to varied results. In 1996, the United States and Switzerland 
replaced the 1951 Treaty by improving the tax information exchange 
provisions and broadening the definition of “tax fraud,”41 but the treaty 
gave more attention to the limitation of its benefits to specific applicable 
parties, rather than to an exchange of information.42 So the 1996 Treaty was 
updated with a mutual agreement in 2003 to give way to “exchange 
information necessary to properly implement the provisions of the 
convention or to prevent tax fraud . . . .”43 In the 2003 Agreement, Swiss 
authorities agreed to turn over account information if the United States 
 
OBERSON & HOWARD R. HULL, SWITZERLAND IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 306 (4th ed. 2011).  
 36  OBERSON & HULL, supra note 35, at 281. The Switzerland Supreme Court judgment on May 16, 
1975, ATF 101 Ib 160, found that the Swiss authorities do not have to provide proof in accordance with 
U.S. implementing legislation. Id.  
 37  Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., Jan. 23, 1977, 273 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]. 
 38  The Swiss MLAT generally excludes “violations with respect to taxes.” Id. art. 2. 
 39  See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving 
International Law Enforcement Cooperations in the Field of Insider Trading, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 31, 
1982, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983), reprinted in 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1737 (Oct. 8, 1982) 
[hereinafter Swiss MOU]. 
 40  See id. at 7–11. In 1981, Switzerland also enacted into law the International Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, which allowed the United States and any other country to obtain legal assistance from 
Switzerland if the offense was considered a crime in Switzerland, see BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER 
INTERNATIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN [IRSG] [FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL 
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS] Mar. 20, 1981, SR 351.1 (Switz.), http://www.admin.ch/opc/ 
en/classified-compilation/19810037/201301010000/351.1.pdf. 
 41  See Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-8 [hereinafter 1996 Treaty] (defining tax fraud as referenced in Article 26 as, “fraudulent 
conduct that causes or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of the tax 
paid to a Contracting State”). 
 42  Compare id. art. 22 (Limitation of Benefits), with id. art. 26 (Exchange of Information). In 
particular, The Memorandum of Understanding for the 1996 Treaty provides detailed explanation and 
examples for Article 22 (Limitation of Benefits). See id.  
 43  See Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz, 
Jan. 30, 2003, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
mutual.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) [hereinafter 2003 Agreement].  
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suspected that an individual was committing a “tax fraud” such as tax 
evasion using offshore accounts.44 Thus, the 2003 Agreement broadened the 
definition of “tax fraud” under the 1996 Treaty. However, it did not 
elaborate on the implementation of the “exchange of information.”45  
Finally, an amendment of the 1996 Treaty was proposed in 2011 to 
inch towards “a more robust exchange of information” between the United 
States and Swiss tax authorities.46 The Amendment based on a 2009 
Protocol with Switzerland would change the standard for when Switzerland 
has to produce tax-related information, moving from the highly restrictive 
“tax fraud” standard to the less restrictive “may be relevant” standard.47 
However, the United States has not been able to take advantage of such 
information exchange system because the Amendment is still pending 
ratification in the Senate.48 Therefore, while the United States has had a 
number of agreements with Switzerland regarding tax evasion, it has not 
been able to actually effectuate a successful information exchange 
mechanism. This would change with FATCA. 
 C. The UBS Scandal and the Lead-up to FATCA 
A major impetus to the enactment of FATCA was the UBS scandal in 
2008. The UBS scandal first pointed out problems with the existing 
qualified intermediary system for foreign financial institutions to report 
U.S.-source income to the IRS and withhold taxes on that income. Then, 
Switzerland’s compliant response to the UBS scandal set the stage to 
 
 44  See id. appendix (outlining 14 examples of tax evasion abuses considered “tax fraud,” each 
involving tax evasion using offshore accounts). 
 45  See id. (lacking explanation of what “exchange of information” entails).  
 46  Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Amending the Swiss Confederation-United 
States, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 52, at III (Jan. 26, 2011). The proposed 2011 Amendment seeks 
to enter into law a Protocol signed between the United States and Switzerland on September 23, 2009, as 
corrected by an exchange of notes effected on November 16, 2010, together with a related agreement 
effected by an exchange of notes on the same day. Id. The Protocol would give IRS greater access to 
Swiss banking records, and improve tax information exchange in a number of ways. See S. PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: THE EFFORT TO COLLECT 
UNPAID TAXES ON BILLIONS IN HIDDEN OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 35-37 (2014) [hereinafter OFFSHORE 
TAX EVASION REPORT]. The Protocol was signed into law in Switzerland in 2012, but has not yet been 
ratified by the Senate. Id. at 37. During the February 26, 2014 Senate Hearing, Credit Suisse pointed to 
the Senate’s failure to ratify the Protocol as the reason that the bank could not provide names of U.S. 
customers. See Joel Schectman, Credit Suisse: Senate Forcing Banks to Keep Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
27, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/27/credit-suisse-senate-forcing-
swiss-banks-to-keep-secrets/. 
 47  EXPLANATION OF 2009 PROTOCOL, supra note 29, at 18. The Amendment follows the U.S. 
Model Income Tax Convention and the OECD standards for exchange of tax information. See Message 
to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Amending the Swiss Confederation-United States, supra note 
46, at III.  
 48  Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
pending/index.htm (last updated Sept. 18, 2014).  
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implement a more robust information exchange program—FATCA. 
 1. The UBS Scandal and Its Illumination of Problems with the 
Qualified Intermediary System 
The Swiss and U.S. perspectives on banking secrecy came to a head-
on collision with the UBS scandal. The U.S. Department of Justice’s 
investigation into UBS AG, a titan in Swiss private banking,49 revealed that 
the bank’s clients used undeclared Swiss Bank accounts to avoid reporting 
$20 billion of income to the IRS.50 This information came to light in 2007 
with the confessions by Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS private banker 
who provided the IRS detailed accounts of how he helped U.S. taxpayers 
evade paying millions in U.S. taxes.51 The Department of Justice responded 
by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida requesting for leave to serve IRS administrative summons (John 
Doe Summons) with UBS, asking to disclose the names of all U.S. clients 
for whom the bank had not filed forms with the IRS disclosing their Swiss 
accounts.52  
In response to the UBS scandal, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations (PSI) in July 2008 held publicized hearings on offshore 
accounts.53 The hearings addressed shortcomings with the current IRS 
program to pursue offshore accounts, the Qualified Intermediary (QI) 
system that has been effective since 2001.54 The QI system requires foreign 
banks to enter into Qualified Intermediary Agreements with the IRS, to 
identify and document any customers who hold U.S. investments or have 
received U.S.-source income into their offshore accounts, and withhold 
 
 49  In 2009, UBS and Credit Suisse together occupied about half of Switzerland’s private banking 
market. KPMG SWITZ & UNIV. OF ST. GALLEN, PRIVATE BANKING IN SWITZERLAND: QUO VADIS? 5 
(2009), available at https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/57055.pdf.  
 50  See Pascal Fletcher & Lisa Jucca, UBS, U.S. Settle Tax Evasion Case, REUTERS, Aug. 12, 2009, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/us-ubs-tax-idUSTRE57B2CF20090812. 
 51  See Laura Saunders et al., Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:24 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577645412614237708. 
Through an ironic turn of events, Birkenfeld, who in 2008 pled guilty to conspiracy for tax avoidance, 
won a $104 million whistle-blower award from the IRS. See Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, UBS 
Whistle-Blower Secures $104 Million Award From IRS, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:03 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/ubs-whistle-blower-birkenfeld-secures-irs-award-lawyers-
say.html. 
 52  See Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 6, 
In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. 2008).  
 53  See Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearings Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. 
on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 9 
(2008) [hereinafter Tax Haven Banks Hearings]. 
 54  See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS AND 
U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE: STAFF REPORT 87 (2008) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT]; Rev. Proc. 
2000-12, 2000-01 C.B. 387. 
5SONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/15 12:53 AM 
The End of Secret Swiss Accounts? 
36:687 (2015) 
697 
income tax from payments of U.S.-source income received by foreigners.55 
 The hearings illuminated flaws in the design of the QI system. The 
most obvious issue is that a low percentage of U.S. income flows in through 
QIs.56 The QI system also only requires reporting on U.S.-source income 
and not foreign-source income,57 and does not require a look-through of 
foreign shell entities to determine the actual beneficial owner of the 
income.58 And while QIs have in place an auditing regime with external 
auditors, the auditors are not required to follow up on indications of fraud 
or illegal acts by the QI.59  
The PSI hearings prompted a policy action. The hearings revealed that 
UBS helped its U.S. clients structure their foreign accounts to avoid QI 
reporting to the IRS.60 In response, then-IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman 
testified that the IRS was “taking a number of steps to enhance the QI 
program.”61 This mobilized the conversation for a stronger reporting regime 
for offshore accounts.62 In October 2009, the House and the Senate 
introduced the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),63 seeking 
to address gaps in the QI system with a penalty withholding tax feature to 
increase compliance.64  
FATCA was ushered into law on March 18, 2010, as part of the Hiring 
Incentives to Restore Employment Act.65 For foreign companies, key 
 
 55  26 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1443 (2013). See also Rev. Proc. 2000-12, supra note 54; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-99, TAX COMPLIANCE: QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM 
PROVIDES SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED, 
BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/270588.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]. 
 56  See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 14. For example, in 2003, about 88% of U.S.-source income 
reported to IRS were not reported by QIs. Id. 
 57  I.R.C. § 1441(a) (2013); see TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 22. 
 58  See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 22. IRS regulations allow withholding agents (domestic and 
QIs) to accept documentation declaring corporations’ ownership of income at face value, unless they 
have “a reason to know” that it is invalid. Rev. Proc. 2008-12, § 5.10.  
 59  TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 24; GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 27.  
 60  TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 16. 
 61  Tax Haven Banks Hearings, supra note 53, at 60 (statement of I.R.S. Comm’r Doug Shulman). 
 62  President Obama’s Fiscal 2010 budget included measures to combat offshore tax evasion. See 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 41–58 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2010.pdf. 
 63  FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 111-3933 (2009); FOREIGN 
ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-1934 (2009); see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX 
COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009 (2009).  
 64  See Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of 
Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury) [hereinafter Foreign Bank Account Reporting 
Hearings].  
 65  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71 (codified 
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FATCA provisions require foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to enter into 
an agreement with the IRS (FFI Agreement).66 They then must undertake 
certain identification and due diligence measures regarding their 
accountholders, report annually to the IRS on their U.S. accountholders, 
and in certain situations withhold and pay to the IRS 30% of any payments 
of U.S.-source income.67 Thus, FATCA sought to create a “powerful 
incentive for foreign financial institutions to provide the IRS with the 
information it needs to identify persons seeking to evade U.S. tax.”68  
 2. Swiss Compliance with IRS Requests 
After FATCA was enacted, there still lingered a big question whether 
Switzerland, a country with a large number of secret U.S. accounts,69 would 
actively participate in the new information-reporting program. Switzerland 
signaled its answer to this question by acquiescing to U.S. requests for 
account information in the aftermath of the UBS scandal.  
To settle the criminal charges from John Doe summons, UBS agreed 
to pay a $780 million penalty and pass on financial data of certain U.S. 
clients.70 However, UBS initially did not comply with U.S. government 
standards, only releasing the names of about 300 individuals who had 
committed the narrow Swiss Penal Code definition of “tax fraud” of 
“affirmative acts of fraud or deception.”71 So in February 2009, the 
Department of Justice filed another civil lawsuit against UBS to seek the 
identities of 52,000 more Americans suspected of hiding total of $15 billion 
at the bank.72 UBS argued that Swiss law prevented them from providing 
information about their clients, and the Swiss government forbid its 
compliance.73 However, under a final three-party agreement between UBS, 
 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). FATCA was modified in 2009 before enacted into law. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 111-4213 (2010); see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-60-
09, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4213, THE “TAX EXTENDERS ACT OF 2009” (2009).  
 66  I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012). 
 67  See I.R.C. § 1471 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4 (2013). 
 68  Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 10 (statement of Stephen E. Shay, 
Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury). 
 69  For example, Credit Suisse, as of 2006, “had over 22,000 U.S. customers with Swiss accounts 
whose assets, at their peak, exceeded 12 billion (CHF)” (about $13 billion). OFFSHORE TAX EVASION 
REPORT, supra note 46, at 3. Most of these accounts were undeclared. Id. 
 70  See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/UBS_Signed_Deferred_Prosecution_ 
Agreement.pdf.  
 71  See Declaration of Barry B. Shott at 6, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009), 
2009 WL 3061580. For the Swiss definition of tax fraud, see supra note 35. 
 72  See Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons at 1, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
19, 2009), 2009 WL 864716. 
 73  Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons at 40, United 
States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1612393. 
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the Swiss government, and the United States on August 19, 2009, UBS 
agreed to disclose the names of 4,450 U.S. account holders suspected by the 
IRS of evading taxes.74  
The UBS settlement created the foundation for Swiss compliance with 
IRS requests.75 Since the UBS scandal, Swiss attitude towards the U.S. 
crackdown on tax evasion can be described of as one of appeasing 
compliance. Fourteen additional major Swiss banks, including Credit 
Suisse, came under criminal investigation by prosecutors across the country 
for aiding tax evasion.76 Wegelin, the oldest Swiss bank, was indicted, pled 
guilty, and then filed for bankruptcy in 2013.77 To prevent other banks from 
suffering the same fate as Wegelin, Switzerland negotiated a non-
prosecution agreement with the United States in August 2013 that requires 
Swiss banks to voluntarily come forward, disclose undeclared American 
assets on their books, and pay related penalties.78 By January 2014, 106 of 
 
 74  Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on the Request 
for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America Regarding UBS AG, 
a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-
Swiss Final UBS Agreement]. In return for the names, the U.S. Department of Justice decided to 
withdraw the summons for names of 52,000 Americans accused of hiding assets in Swiss accounts. See 
id. at 3. 
 75  See Settlement Agreement at 2, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/bank_agreement.pdf. UBS agreed to provide information about account 
holders with accounts subject to the treaty request, based on an established criterion to the Swiss Federal 
Tax Administration. Id. 
 76  See David Voreacos, Secret Swiss Accounts Said No Longer Safe for Tax Dodging, BLOOMBERG 
(Sep. 3, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-08/secret-swiss-accounts-said-no-
longer-safe-for-tax-dodging.html. Four Credit Suisse Group AG bankers were indicted in February 
2011, then three more in July 2011, for conspiring to help U.S. clients evade taxes through secret bank 
accounts. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Adami, et al., No. 1:11-95 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2011); 
Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Walder, et al., No. 1:11-95 (E.D. Va. Jul. 21, 2011). In 
2011, Credit Suisse set aside $324 million to deal with this issue, but the Department of Justice ended up 
settling with the bank for $2.6 billion. See John Letzing, Francesco Guerrera, & David Enrich, Credit 
Suisse Settlement with U.S. Could Top $800 Million, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304632204579336671237500260; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to 
Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns (May 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aid-and-assist-us-taxpayers-filing-
false-returns. 
 77  See Raymond & Browning, supra note 2. 
 78  See Joint Statement Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal Department 
of Finance, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
7532013829164644664074.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Joint Statement]. The banks that take part in the non-
prosecution program are required to provide details on American accounts, “inform on banks that 
transferred money into secret accounts or that accepted money when secret accounts were closed,” and 
“reveal all cross-border activities and close accounts of Americans evading taxes..” Robert W. Wood, 
Swiss Bank Frey To Close Over IRS Investigation, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2013, 11:09 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/10/17/swiss-bank-frey-to-close-over-irs-investigation/. 
“The fines for banks are set in tiers based on time.” For example, “banks that held accounts as of August 
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some 300 Swiss banks signed onto the program,79 the goal of which was to 
“enable every Swiss bank that is not already under criminal investigation to 
find a path to resolution.”80 This series of events set up an environment for 
Swiss compliance with FATCA.81  
In addition to its dealings with the United States, Switzerland also 
made attempts to comply with international transparency standards by 
signing twelve bilateral tax cooperation agreements with OECD members.82 
In 2013, Switzerland signed the OECD Tax Convention to become the 58th 
country to join the OECD’s convention on sharing tax information with 
foreign tax authorities.83 As Switzerland responds to pressure from the 
United States to help fight tax evasion, its actions signal how Swiss political 
support for bank secrecy may have diminished in the recent years.84 
 II. FATCA AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN SWITZERLAND 
Since its 2010 enactment, FATCA has been at the center of both 
revelation and criticism as the world geared up for its official rollout in 
 
1, 2008, must pay a fine equal to 20% of the top dollar value of all non-disclosed accounts.” Id. 
However, fourteen banks already under investigation by the U.S. government are excluded from the 
agreement. See 2013 Joint Statement, supra note 78, at § I.A.  
 79  June 2014 Update on the Tax Division’s Program for Non-Prosecution Agreements or Non-
Target Letters for Swiss Banks, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/ 
june-2014-update-tax-division-s-program-non-prosecution-agreements-or-non-target-letters. 
 80  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, United States and Switzerland 
Issue Joint Statement Regarding Tax Evasion Investigations (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-and-switzerland-issue-joint-statement-regarding-tax-
evasion-investigations. 
 81  Note that Swiss banks are generally uneasy about the non-prosecution program: most of the 
banks surveyed by EY have “somewhat negative” or “negative” view of the effect of the disclosure 
program on Switzerland as a financial center. ERNST & YOUNG, EY BANKING BAROMETERS 2014: 
NEW REALITIES IN SWISS BANKING 18 (2014).  
 82  See Mathieu van Berchem, Switzerland Passes OECD Grey List Hurdle, SWISSINFO.CH (June 1, 
2011, 10:41 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_ 
results,_regulations/Switzerland_passes_OECD_grey_list_hurdle.html?cid=3037085. As result of the 
UBS scandal, Switzerland was added to OECD’s “Grey List” of tax havens in 2009, and had to sign 
bilateral agreements to get off the list. Id.  
 83  Switzerland Signs OECD Tax Convention, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2013, 9:36 PM), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/us-oecd-switzerland-idINBRE99E0MV20131015. 
 84  Switzerland’s current Finance Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf has pushed for greater 
administrative assistance and disclosure to fight international tax evasion. Switzerland’s Parliament and 
Federal Council have taken legislative actions in this effort. See Swiss Edge Further Away from Bank 
Secrecy with New Tax Steps, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/10/09/us-swiss-tax-idUSBRE9980IW20131009 (describing that Switzerland is bowing 
under pressure from the United States and the EU to end bank secrecy); Catherine Bosley, Swiss 
Bankers Stripped of Secrecy as Data Swap Embraced, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2013, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-17/swiss-bankers-stripped-of-secrecy-as-minister-embraces-
data-swap.html (reporting that Switzerland’s interactions with the United States signal “cleaning-up of 
the legacies,” and that the country is heading toward automatic exchange of information). 
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2014.85 The United States has successfully negotiated a number of 
intergovernmental agreements, including with Switzerland, to facilitate 
FATCA’s implementation around the world. In this section, I will first 
highlight the key features of FATCA. Next, I will describe the two types of 
FATCA model intergovernmental agreements. This will then segue into an 
explanation of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement.  
 A. Mechanics of FATCA 
FATCA was designed to strengthen U.S. law in tax withholding 
procedures and weak information arrangement between countries.86 It boils 
down to a two-prong approach: first, disclosure requirements for U.S. 
taxpayers with foreign accounts,87 and second, more controversial 
requirements for “foreign financial institutions” (FFIs).88 This section will 
focus on the requirements for FFIs.  
In a nutshell, FFIs have to sign an agreement with the IRS (FFI 
Agreement) to identify the residency status of their clients, and provide the 
IRS with U.S. account information.89 FFIs are broadly defined:90 in addition 
to banks, non-U.S. entities such as broker/dealers, insurance companies, 
hedge funds, securitization vehicles, and private equity funds are considered 
 
 85  FATCA has faced great opposition domestically and internationally because of the associated 
costs, capital flight risk, and problems with implementation, and so some pressed for the act to be 
repealed. See, e.g., RepealFatca.com Is a Website Dedicated to Getting Rid of the Worst Law Most 
Americans Have Never Heard of, REPEAL FATCA, http://www.repealfatca.com/ (last visited March 5, 
2015). Scholars have emphasized the need for multinational cooperation for FATCA to work. See, e.g., 
J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential 
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012); Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global 
Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529 (2012). The strength of arguments for repeal of FATCA has 
diminished since 2010-2011, as the United States’ battle against offshore tax evasion has gained 
momentum. William Hoffman, Former IRS Head Miller Unsure if FATCA’s Benefits Outweigh Costs, 
TAX ANALYSTS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/ 
1BF1D85CF640117A85257D6B00537F71?OpenDocument. As of spring 2015, the United States has 
signed bilateral IGAs with fifty-five jurisdictions. Resource Center, FATCA - Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx, 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter FATCA Resource Center].  
 86  Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 9–10. Note that there have been 
bills proposed to update or amend parts of the FATCA to heighten the stringency of FATCA 
enforcement. See, e.g., Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 174, 114th Cong. (2015); Cut Unjustified Tax 
Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 87  See I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2012). Individual U.S. taxpayers with foreign accounts and assets 
exceeding $50,000 on the last day of the tax year have to report them on an information return. Id.  
 88  See I.R.C. § 1471. 
 89  See id. 
 90  FFIs include any foreign entity that accepts deposits, holds financial assets for others as a 
substantial portion of its business, or engages in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities, partnership interests, or commodities. See id. 1471(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(b)(3) 
(2013). 
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FFIs.91 
FFIs have to sign up with the IRS and comply with a number of 
reporting requirements. FFIs must obtain information for each account 
holder to determine whether the account is a “U.S. account”—an account of 
a U.S. person or foreign entity with substantial U.S. ownership.92 Under 
Final Treasury Regulations for FATCA, FFIs have to conduct a stringent 
due diligence and verification process to identify, document, and classify 
existing client relationships.93 FFIs then have to report information on U.S. 
account holders to the IRS.94 Required information includes account 
balance or value of each U.S. account,95 as well as amount of dividends, 
interest, other income, and gross proceeds from the sale of property credited 
to a U.S. account.96  
While FATCA is theoretically “voluntary,” FFIs that do not sign an 
agreement with the IRS are subject to a 30% withholding tax on U.S.-
derived income including interest, dividends, gross proceeds from 
disposition of U.S. securities, and pass-through payments.97 Also, U.S. 
account holders that do not provide requested information to FFIs in order 
to comply with FFI Agreements will be considered “recalcitrant account 
holders”98 and FFIs must withhold a 30% tax on the U.S.-source payments 
it makes to those account holders.99  
 B. FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements  
The IRS has recognized that the international reach of FATCA could 
be at odds with local laws, and that foreign government cooperation will be 
necessary to enforce FATCA around the globe.100 With that in mind, the 
 
 91  DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, FATCA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/dcom-unitedstates/local%20assets/documents/tax/us_tax_fatca_faqs_061
711.pdf. 
 92  See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(1). 
 93  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
INFORMATION REPORTING BY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND WITHHOLDING ON CERTAIN 
PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER FOREIGN ENTITIES 38, 39 (2013); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1471-4(c).  
 94  See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(3). 
 95  See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5. 
 96  See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4. 
 97  See I.R.C. § 1471(b). 
 98  See id. § 1471(d)(6). 
 99  See id. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i). 
 100 When the Treasury issued Proposed FATCA Regulations in February 2012, it also issued a joint 
statement with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving international Tax Compliance and 
Implementing FATCA (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Fr-Ger-It-Sp-UK-02-07-2012.pdf. In the 
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Treasury developed Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), beginning with 
the U.K. in 2012.101 Since then, the United States has signed bilateral IGAs 
with more than fifty-five countries, and has reached agreements in 
substance with fifty-seven additional jurisdictions.102  
To facilitate IGAs, FATCA Model Agreement I (Model I) created a 
framework that allows foreign institutions to report the necessary 
information regarding U.S. accounts to their respective governments rather 
than to IRS directly, while still avoiding FATCA withholding.103 Thus, 
Model I provides for an automatic exchange of information between IRS 
and the foreign tax authority.104 As defined by the OECD, automatic 
exchange of information “involves the systematic and periodic transmission 
of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country of income to the 
country of residence of the taxpayer concerning various categories of 
income.”105 The automatically exchanged information is collected by the 
tax authorities in the source country and systematically sent to the tax 
authorities in the residence country.106 Commentators favor this automatic 
exchange of information for reasons including timeliness, early fraud 
detection, deterrent effects that increase voluntary compliance, and ease of 
administrability.107  
 With respect to Switzerland, the United States’ parallel joint 
statements with Japan and Switzerland in June 2012 revealed an alternative 
model agreement (Model II) for FATCA implementation.108 Under Model 
 
statement, the six governments agreed to explore a common approach to FATCA implementation 
through domestic reporting and reciprocal automatic exchange, based on six existing bilateral treaties. 
Id. 
 101 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Improve international Tax Compliance and 
to Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K., Sep. 12, 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-
2012.pdf. The fact that IGAs are not treaties means that they do not have to be ratified by U.S. Senate, 
and can be concluded quickly. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 723.2-2 
(2006). 
 102 See FATCA Resource Center, supra note 85.  
 103 Model IA (reciprocal) and Model IB (non-reciprocal) versions are available on Resource Center, 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).  
 104 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the French Republic to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement 
FATCA, U.S.-Fr., art. 3 ¶ 6, Nov. 14, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/ 
BilateralAgreementUSFranceImplementFATCA.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-French Agreement].  
 105 See OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: THE NEXT STEP 3 (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Background_Brief_AEOI_27082013.pdf. 
 106 See id. at 3–4. 
 107 See id. at 5; Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 
348-65 (2012). 
 108 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and 
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II, the financial institutions themselves have to send the names and data of 
their customers directly to the IRS after obtaining consent from their 
customers.109 Thus, the exchange of information is not between 
governments as in Model I, but rather between the FFIs and the IRS.110 The 
joint statements with Japan and Switzerland created a launch pad for the 
agreement between the United States and Switzerland for implementation 
of FATCA (the U.S.-Swiss Agreement), which was signed on February 14, 
2013.111  
 C. The U.S.-Swiss Agreement 
The U.S.-Swiss Agreement, based on Model II, requires Switzerland 
to direct all reporting Swiss financial institutions to register with the IRS by 
January 1, 2014, and to comply with FATCA due diligence, reporting, and 
withholding requirements.112 Switzerland agreed to instruct reporting Swiss 
financial institutions to request certain information from preexisting 
account holders and report it to the IRS, and to obtain consent from new 
account holders to report this information as a condition for opening the 
account.113 The U.S.-Swiss Agreement guarantees Swiss financial 
institutions that they will not be prosecuted in Switzerland if they report 
bank information to the IRS.114 Otherwise, Swiss financial institutions 
 
Switzerland Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA (June 
21, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-
Statement-US-Switzerland-06-21-2012.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement with Switzerland]; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and Japan Regarding a 
Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA and Improve International Tax 
Compliance (June 21, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/ 
FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Japan-06-21-2012.pdf. 
 109 Compare Joint Statement with Switzerland, supra note 109, with Model I (where the FFIs do not 
need to obtain consent or waiver from customers — all relevant information about U.S. account holders 
is reported to local tax authorities, which then automatically report the information to the IRS.) Models I 
and II confer different advantages and disadvantages regarding due diligence, information reporting, 
withholding, enforcement, etc. See RAYMOND J. HOLST, JIYEON LEE-LIM & WILLIAM LU, LATHAM & 
WATKINS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER FATCA: COMPARING THE TWO MODELS 2–5 
(2013), available at https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/intergovernmental-agreements-under-fatca. 
A potential FATCA partner has to consider its own priorities, and also weigh the benefits versus the 
burdens under each model. Id. at 5. 
 110 See Joint Statement with Switzerland, supra note 109.  
 111 Agreement Between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation to Facilitate 
the Implementation of FATCA, U.S.-Switz., Feb. 13, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-
Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Agreement]. 
 112 See id. art. 3.  
 113 See id. (FFIs have to collect information such as the name, address, and Tax Identification 
Number of the U.S. account holder, the account number, the account balance or value, and payments 
made with respect to the account holder); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471–4(d)(3).  
 114 See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 4. 
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would have to make the difficult decision to either comply with FATCA or 
face disclosure liability under the Swiss Penal Code.115 The Swiss 
government has essentially lifted the veil of banking secrecy with respect to 
U.S. customer information within the parameters of FATCA.  
The mechanics of U.S.-Swiss Agreement operates as follows. In order 
to service U.S. customers, a Swiss financial institution has to enter into a 
FFI agreement with the IRS to comply with IRS reporting requirements 
according to Final FATCA Regulations.116 Entering into a FFI agreement 
eliminates the FFI’s 30% penalty tax on all payments of U.S.-source 
income.117 After entering into a FFI agreement, the financial institution has 
to receive consent from a U.S. person or U.S.-owned foreign entity in order 
to supply their information to the IRS.118 If the account holder declines 
consent, the financial institution cannot deliver individual information to 
the IRS without violating Swiss banking secrecy rules still in effect.119  
However, Swiss financial institutions will be required to annually 
report “aggregate information” on non-consenting accountholders to the 
IRS.120 The U.S. Competent Authority (the Secretary of Treasury) may then 
use the aggregate information received as the basis for submitting a “group 
request” for specific information.121 Upon receiving a group request, the 
Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Swiss FTA) has to follow specific 
procedures to provide the information to the U.S. Competent Authority.122 
Swiss financial institutions are not required to withhold tax or close non-
consenting accounts unless a group request has been received and the Swiss 
financial institution is unable to provide the Swiss FTA with information to 
be exchanged with the IRS within eight months.123  
In sum, the U.S.-Swiss Agreement is more cooperative than any of the 
prior agreements with the United States regarding offshore tax evasion or 
tax collection.  
 III. THE IMPACT OF FATCA ON THE SWISS BANKING 
INDUSTRY 
Since its introduction, FATCA has had and will continue to have a 
significant impact on the Swiss banking industry. FATCA turned the Swiss 
banks’ long-held tradition of secrecy upside down, and the banking industry 
 
 115 For discussion on Swiss laws on bank secrecy, see supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.  
 116 See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 3 ¶ 1(a). 
 117 See id. art. 6.  
 118 See id. art. 3 ¶ 1(b)(i). 
 119 See id. art. 7 ¶ 1. 
 120 See id. art. 5 ¶ 1. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See id. art. 5 ¶ 3. 
 123 See id. art. 7 ¶ 1(b). 
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is witnessing the micro and macro-level economic impacts of its 
implementation. In this section, I will first show that the semi-automatic 
nature of information exchange in the U.S.-Swiss Agreement creates a new 
standard for banking transparency in Switzerland, in sharp contrast to 
Switzerland’s previous information exchange policies. Then I will explain 
Switzerland’s incentives to proactively comply with FATCA, and the 
additional measures it introduced to facilitate its compliance. Finally, I will 
describe how Switzerland’s compliance with FATCA is reshaping the look 
and character of the Swiss banking industry and affecting the 
competitiveness of Swiss banks in the world stage. 
 A. A Semi-Automatic Exchange of Information: A Huge Shift for 
Switzerland 
The current U.S.-Swiss Agreement provides for a Model II “semi-
automatic exchange of information,”124 a level of disclosure that represents 
a huge step toward transparency for Switzerland. In the context of 
Switzerland’s legal construct for secret banking, where bankers are subject 
to criminal penalties if they do not protect the identities of their clients,125 
the U.S.-Swiss Agreement’s provision for systematic exchange of account 
information presents a stark juxtaposition.  
Although the U.S.-Swiss Agreement does not provide for a completely 
automatic exchange of information as defined by the OECD,126 and there is 
no reciprocity requirement in law127 for U.S. institutions to disclose the 
 
 124 Armando Mombelli, FATCA Sounds Death Knell of Banking Secrecy, SWISSINFO.CH, May 28, 
2013, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/FATCA_sounds_death_knell_of_banking_secrecy.html? 
cid=35956046. 
 125 See supra Part III.A.  
 126 According to the OECD, automatic exchange of information “involves the systematic and 
periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country of income to the country of 
residence of the taxpayer concerning various categories of income.” See supra notes 105–107 and 
accompanying text. 
 127 FATCA was written as a unilateral system for foreign financial institutions to provide 
information, but the Treasury has negotiated a number of IGAs with promises of reciprocity on United 
States’ part. See, e.g. Agreement Between the Department of Treasury of the United States of America 
and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to Improve International 
Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., art. 6(1), Apr. 17, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/ 
FATCA-Agreement-Mexico-4-17-2014.pdf. To move towards reciprocity, the Treasury has 
promulgated regulations to require U.S. banks and credit unions to report information on interest paid to 
nonresident aliens. 26 C.F.R §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5)–8. Additionally, Treasury’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to facilitate reporting and tax 
compliance investigation in order to advance international commitments made through FATCA 
reciprocal IGAs. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Issues Proposed Rules to Enhance 
Financial Transparency (July 30, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
jl2595.aspx; Jay R. Nanavati, United States: Treasury’s FinCEN Proposes Rules Forcing U.S. Financial 
Institutions To Collect Data For FATCA Reciprocity, NASDAQ, Aug. 5, 2014, 
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same information to Swiss authorities, the Agreement has many of the 
features that an automatic exchange of information system aims for. The 
U.S.-Swiss Agreement is a two-step information exchange: while the main 
exchange is between the financial institution and the IRS, the Swiss FTA 
steps in upon a group request and delivers information to the U.S. 
authorities when there is hindrance from non-consenting account holders.128 
Thus, there is a “systemic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer 
information by the source country of income to the country of residence of 
the taxpayer” as is the case for a completely automatic system.129  
Moreover, the U.S.-Swiss Agreement is even more remarkable when 
compared to other multilateral tax agreements that Switzerland has recently 
engaged in. In the few years prior to FATCA, Switzerland entered into 
“Rubik Agreements”130 with key trading partners Austria, Germany and the 
U.K. that focused on anonymous tax withholding as a substitute for 
automatic information exchange for non-Swiss residents holding Swiss 
accounts.131 For example, the Swiss-Austria agreement requires Swiss 
banks to levy a 25% withholding tax on future investment income and 
capital gains of Austrian tax residents equal to the Austrian capital yields 
tax.132 The Swiss banks then transfer the proceeds of the withholding tax to 
the Austrian Ministry of Finance.133 Once the Swiss banks impose the 




 128 See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 5 ¶ 3. 
 129 See OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: THE NEXT STEP, supra note 106, at 3.  
 130 The “Rubik” model (like the name of the famous puzzle) was created by the Swiss Association of 
Foreign Banks to separate income from wealth and send tax at source to third countries, while 
maintaining the Swiss bank account holder’s anonymity. See British Receive Initial Funds From Tax 
Deal, SWISSINFO.CH, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/british-receive-initial-funds-from-tax-
deal/34867206; see also infra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.  
 131 See Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Republik Osterreich 
uber die Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Swiss 
Confederation and Austria on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and Financial Markets], Austria-
Switz., Apr. 13, 2012 (Ger.), available at Http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/ 
attachments/26559.pdf [hereinafter Swiss-Austria Cooperation Agreement]; Agreement Between the 
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Cooperation in 
the Area of Taxation, U.K.-Switz., Oct. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Swiss-U.K. Cooperation Agreement]; 
Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 
uber Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and 
Financial Markets], Germ.-Switz., Sept. 21, 2011 (Ger), available at http://www.news.admin.ch/ 
NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/24360.pdf, [hereinafter Swiss-Ger. Cooperation Agreement]. 
 132 The Austrian-Swiss Tax Agreement, NEWSLETTER (Baker & McKenzie, Vienna, Austria), April 
2012, at 3, available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Austria/Newsroom 
/NL_AustriaSwissTaxAgreement_Apr2012.pdf [hereinafter Baker & McKenzie Newsletter].  
 133 See id. at 4. 
 134 See id. at 3. Alternatively, Austrian taxpayers can authorize their Swiss bank to report their future 
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Further, Switzerland reports to the partner country names of ten 
jurisdictions to which the partner country residents who close their Swiss 
accounts transfer the largest volume of assets, as well as the number of 
partner country residents who moved funds out of Switzerland to those 
jurisdictions.135 However, Switzerland does not have to disclose the actual 
identity of those individuals.136 These arrangements are intended to 
maintain client anonymity through anonymous withholding.137 The end 
result encourages Switzerland’s partner country to pressure the jurisdictions 
where the partner country’s residents move their money to create additional 
Rubik Agreements with the partner country, further perpetuating Rubik 
Agreements as the standard.138  
In effect, the Rubik Agreements allow Swiss financial institutions to 
opt for in-country tax withholding instead of bulk transmission of account 
information back to the resident country.139 While there are a number of 
significant administrative issues raised by this method,140 the anonymous 
withholding method has been justified by Switzerland “as a means of 
protect[ing] the financial privacy of account holders.”141 But from the 
partner countries’ perspective, automatic exchange of information is 
superior to anonymous withholding for reasons such as reaching untaxed 
principle, maintaining a sense of fairness, and providing a multilateral 
solution.142 Practically speaking, these anonymous withholding agreements 
have hampered the emergence of automatic cross-border information 
reporting system. Their endorsement by Switzerland, a major offshore asset 
management center, has diminished Switzerland’s opportunity to lead other 
 
investment income and capital gains directly to the Austrian Ministry of Finance. Id. at 4. Then the 
withholding would not apply, but the taxpayer has to declare the income in his annual income tax return. 
Id. 
 135 See Grinberg, supra note 108, at 342.  
 136 See id.  
 137 See id.  
 138 See id.  
 139 See id. 
 140 Swiss banks themselves have to compute and withhold the tax amounts for each customer after 
figuring out their individual tax residency and assets in possession. Then the proceeds are remitted 
anonymously to the partner country. See id. at 340–41.  
 141 See id. at 339. These anonymous withholding agreements assert that they achieve a level of 
cooperation that would be “equivalent” to an automatic exchange of information. Id. at 342–43 (citing 
Swiss-Austria Cooperation Agreement, supra note 133, art. 1; Swiss-U.K. Cooperation Agreement, 
supra note 133, art. 1; Swiss-Ger. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 133, art. 1). Thus, Switzerland’s 
ratification of these agreements with key financial centers would achieve a political goal of Swiss 
policy, the acceptance of the idea that anonymous withholding is equivalent to automatic exchange of 
information. Id. at 343. 
 142 See Anonymous Withholding Agreements and the Future of International Cooperation in Taxing 
Foreign Financial Accounts: Testimony before the Finance Committee of the German Bundestag, 
September 24, 2012 (statement by Associate Professor Itai Grinberg, Geo. U. L. Center), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2083&context=facpub. 
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financial centers towards a more open exchange system.143  
Thus, by agreeing to an exchange of information and supplying 
detailed account information to the U.S. government instead of withholding 
anonymously, the U.S.-Swiss FATCA Agreement represents a fundamental 
shift from Switzerland’s previous information disclosure policies. More 
remarkably, Switzerland has recently indicated an intention to negotiate a 
reciprocal Model I IGA to replace its Model II IGA.144 This is a big step for 
Switzerland — among other changes, going from Model II to Model I will 
place a greater administrative burden for Switzerland because the Swiss tax 
authority will act as an intermediary between FFIs and the IRS.145 On the 
other hand, Model I’s automatic exchange of information between 
governments reduces compliance costs for FFIs.146 Model I is the OECD’s 
“preferred route for the implementation of FATCA,” and also serves as the 
template for the common international model for automatic exchange of 
information.147 Thus, the anticipated change will perpetuate the “Swiss 
commitment to automatic exchange of information at the [g]lobal 
[f]orum.”148  
 B. Changes in the Swiss Banking Landscape Due to FATCA  
The Swiss banking landscape has already been shaped, and will 
continue to be shaped by FATCA. This is because Switzerland is 
economically incentivized to actively comply with FATCA despite its high 
costs. Also, recent events in Switzerland continue to demonstrate the 
country’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on tax related matters. In 
turn, FATCA will have a significant impact on the nature of the Swiss 
banking industry.  
 
 143 See Grinberg, supra note 108, at 340. 
 144 See Press Release, The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, Automatic Exchange of 
Information in Tax Matters: Federal Council Adopts Negotiation Mandates With Partner States (Oct. 8, 
2014), available at http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=54768 [hereinafter 
Swiss Automatic Exchange of Information Press Release]. 
 145 See id. For a discussion of differences between IGA Models I and II, see supra notes 103–111 
and accompanying text. 
 146 See Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Welcomes Multilateral Efforts to Improve International 
Tax Compliance and Transparency (Jul. 26, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/ 
taxoecdwelcomesmultilateraleffortstoimproveinternationaltaxcomplianceandtransparency.htm. 
 147 OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION: BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION BRIEF 5–6 (2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/Automatic-Exchange-Financial-Account-Information-Brief.pdf [hereinafter BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION BRIEF]. Also, Model I is generally viewed as more attractive because it provides more 
legal certainty and scope for implementation. SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING 
GROUP, ACTIVELY SHAPING TRANSITION–FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR BANKING IN SWITZERLAND 12 
(2014), available at http://shop.sba.ch/1000015_e.pdf. For a discussion on automatic exchange of 
information as OECD’s new global standard, see infra notes 199, 200 and accompanying text.  
 148 Swiss Automatic Exchange of Information Press Release, supra note 146. 
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 1. Switzerland’s Proactive Compliance Efforts 
It is evident that Switzerland is making proactive efforts to comply 
with FATCA requirements. Swiss banks cannot escape FATCA because not 
only is U.S. an important market, but the 30% penalty for FFIs are triggered 
on their payments of U.S.-source income. Also, recent judicial and 
parliamentary decisions in Switzerland indicate the country’s willingness to 
comply with FATCA requirements.  
To begin, while FATCA presents significant administrative burdens, 
Swiss banks will make an effort to comply because of the importance of the 
U.S. market for Swiss banks. Some of the criticisms of FATCA point to 
reports that Swiss banks are denying accounts to U.S citizens in order to 
evade FATCA compliance.149 There also seems to be evidence that U.S. 
citizens are renouncing their citizenship to avoid U.S. taxation150: the 
number of people renouncing their U.S. citizenship set a new record in 
2013, and a recent survey revealed that 76% of Americans abroad feel 
incentivized to give up their U.S. passports.151 However, it is not feasible 
for Swiss institutions to simply deny accounts to all U.S. individuals and 
entities.152 The size of U.S. wealth still remains attractive for Swiss banks—
North America occupied 36% of global millionaire wealth in 2008, and its 
share is expected to hover around 34% in 2016.153 As the CEO of private 
Swiss bank Vontobel put it, “the U.S. is simply too big, too wealthy[,] and 
too important.”154  
 
 149 See Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 70 (noting that U.K., Swiss, 
Dutch, and Spanish banks are refusing as clients U.S. citizens living in their countries). 
 150 Laura Saunders, Overseas Americans: Time to Say ‘Bye’ to Uncle Sam?; Chased by the U.S. 
Government, Thousands Are Severing Ties With America. Here’s What You Need to Know, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 16, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323455104579014772169287210.html. 
But note that renunciation of citizenship requires individuals to file back taxes, pay any penalties owed, 
and also face exit tax on individuals with annual income of $150,000 or have a net worth of at least $2 
million. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (2006).  
 151 Robert W. Wood, Americans Renounce Citizenship In New Record Numbers, FORBES, Oct. 30, 
2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/10/30/americans-renounce-citizenship-in-record-
numbers-why-you-should-care/; Robert W. Wood, 5.5 Million Americans Eye Giving Up U.S. 
Citizenship, Survey Reveals, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/ 
10/27/5-5-million-americans-eye-giving-up-u-s-citizenship-survey-reveals/. 
 152 See Kelly Phillips Erb, The Biggest Story in Banking, Thanks to IRS, FORBES, Mar. 21, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/03/21/the-biggest-story-in-banking-thanks-to-irs/2/. 
 153 MCKINSEY & COMPANY MCKINSEY GLOBAL PRIVATE BANKING SURVEY 2013: CAPTURING THE 
NEW GENERATION OF CLIENTS 10 (2013), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey%20offices/switzerland/latest%20thinking/private_ 
banking_survey_2013.ashx. Compare U.S.’s numbers with the market share of all of emerging markets 
combined (Asia Pacific excluding Japan, Middle East, Latin America, Central Europe, Africa): 24% in 
2008 and expected to rise to 37% in 2016. Id.  
 154 U.S. Wealth Market Still Attractive for Swiss Banks – Vontobel CEO, REUTERS, Sep. 12, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/vontobel-unitedstates-ceo-idUSL5N0H831J20130912. The 
CEO commented that the profit margins in emerging markets “are less attractive than in the U.S.” Id.  
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Additionally, refusing to accept U.S. account holders will not relieve a 
FFI from being subject to FATCA because the 30% withholding tax for 
FFIs that do not sign a FFI Agreement is triggered on their U.S.-source 
income.155 Switzerland is among the top investors in the U.S.: Swiss 
cumulative investment was estimated at $212 billion in 2013, and U.S. 
represented 19.8% of Switzerland’s direct investment abroad in 2011.156 
Also, Swiss finance and insurance affiliates are estimated to hold more than 
$1.4 trillion in U.S. assets.157 So in order for FFIs to avoid 30% tax on 
investments earned in the U.S., they have to comply with FATCA reporting 
regulations. While FATCA may lead to Swiss institutions discouraging 
U.S. investments, Swiss financial institutions ultimately will not be able to 
overlook the significance of the U.S. capital market.158  
Further, recent events in Switzerland reaffirm the country’s 
willingness to cooperate with U.S. on tax evasion matters under specified 
parameters. On July 5, 2013, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland 
ruled that IRS’s “group requests” under the 1996 Treaty is permissible if 
the requests include enough detail to establish grounds for suspicion of 
fraud.159 Thus, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision that Credit 
Suisse can reveal client data to U.S. authorities.160 Yet, with the 2011 
Amendment to the 1996 Treaty still pending ratification in the U.S. 
Senate,161 Switzerland is trying to ascertain the boundaries of this 
decision.162 On January 6, 2014, the Federal Administrative Court in St. 
 
 155 See I.R.C. § 1471; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2. 
 156 EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SWISS FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT 2013 3, 4 (2013), available at http://www.s-
ge.com/sites/default/files/FDI%20Switzerland-US_0.pdf.  
 157 Id. at 3. 
 158 See B.J. Henderson et al., World Markets for Raising New Capital, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 73–75 
(2006) (finding that U.S. has the largest capital market in the world, and is home to 66% of the total 
global cross-border equity issues). See also Stavros Peristiani, Evaluating the Relative Strength of the 
U.S. Capital Markets, CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York, N.Y.), 
July 2007, at 1 available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci13-6.pdf (noting that 
New York City is a leading site for conducting business because the effective performance of U.S. 
capital markets).  
 159 See Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Exchange of Information in Tax Matters with 
the United States – The Federal Supreme Court Rejects a First Appeal, at 1 (Jul. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bger.ch/fr/press-news-2c_269_2013-eng-t.pdf. 
 160 See Robert Wood, Swiss Banks Reveal Americans, U.K. Deal Sputters, And Germany Embraces 
FATCA, FORBES, Jul. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/07/09/swiss-banks-reveal-
americans-u-k-deal-sputters-and-germany-embraces-fatca/. This was a follow-up to 2011, when Swiss 
tax authorities gave the go-ahead to temporarily circumvent Switzerland’s vaunted bank secrecy laws. 
 161 For a discussion of the 2011 Amendment, see supra notes 46–48. 
 162 During the March 2014 Senate Hearing on offshore tax evasion, Credit Suisse urged the Senate 
to pass the 2011 Amendment, which would “allow for much more information to be provided on U.S. 
client accounts to U.S. authorities.” CREDIT SUISSE, LEGACY U.S.-SWISS TAX ISSUES: STATEMENT OF 
CREDIT SUISSE, FOR UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 5 (2014). For more on the 2011 
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Gallen blocked Julius Baer’s transfer of account information to the IRS163 
because the IRS’s request did not meet the “level of detail which is required 
. . . for which administrative assistance can be granted.”164 Nevertheless, 
while the federal court delayed Julius Baer’s release of information given 
the circumstances, the decision does not necessarily threaten the core of the 
Supreme Court’s July 2013 ruling permitting banks to respond to IRS’s 
group requests within sufficient parameters.165 
Finally, in September 2013, the Swiss parliament voted in favor of a 
Swiss law that requires Swiss banks to report the holdings of U.S. clients to 
U.S. tax authorities, essentially enacting FATCA as law.166 The Swiss 
House of Representatives and the Senate both approved the law, after the 
lower house initially rejected the bill twice and fueled speculation that 
Switzerland would not comply with FATCA.167 Thus, Swiss Banking 
Association’s “welcoming of the signing of the [U.S.-Swiss Agreement]” 
for reducing the “complexity and costs arising from the unilateral FATCA 
legislation” seems to have symbolized the country’s willingness to 
cooperate with U.S. authorities regarding FATCA.168  
 2. Impact on the Swiss Banking Industry 
The burden of implementing FATCA is substantially impacting the 
economic health of the individual Swiss banks as their costs rise and 
 
Amendment, see also supra note 46. 
 163 See BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT [BVGE] [FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT] Jan. 6, 2014, 
A-5390/2013 (Switz.), available at http://media.journalofaccountancy.com/JOA/Issues/2014/01 
/2013_WEB.pdf. 
 164 Press Release, Tribunal Administrative Federal, Julius Baer: IRS Request for Administrative 
Assistance Not Sufficient for the Disclosure of Client Data, at 1 (Jan. 8, 2014). The Press Release states 
that administrative assistance will not be provided for presumed tax evasion, even if high amounts are at 
stake” (emphasis added. Id. In this case, the court found that IRS only “abstractly described the conduct 
of Julius Baer clients,” and the enclosed indictment of Julius Baer employees does not set forth any 
conduct that could be considered as “tax fraud.” Id.  
 165 See Julius Baer Decision Offers Little Safety for Hidden Swiss Accounts, DAILY TAX REPORT, 
Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.bna.com/julius-baer-decision-n17179881397/; Giles Broom, Swiss Court 
Blocks Julius Baer Client Data Transfer to U.S., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8, 2014, 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-08/swiss-court-blocks-julius-baer-client-data-transfer-to-
u-dot-s. 
 166 Swiss Parliament Green-Lights US Anti-Tax Evasion Deal, GLOBALPOST, Sep. 9, 2013, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130909/swiss-parliament-green-lights-us-anti-tax-
evasion-deal. 
 167 See Senate Approves FATCA Legislation, SWISSINFO.CH, Sep. 23, 2013, 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/Senate_approves_FATCA_legislation.html?cid=36963642; Kelly 
Phillips Erb, After Official Rejection, Holes in Swiss Policy Leave Banking Industry Uncertain, FORBES, 
June 23, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/06/23/after-official-rejection-holes-in-
swiss-policy-leave-banking-industry-uncertain/. 
 168 Press Release, Swiss Bankers Association, Statement From the SBA Regarding the Signing of 
the FATCA Agreement (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.swissbanking.org/en/stellungnahme-20130214. 
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margins fall. FATCA is perpetuating the consolidation of Swiss banks that 
began during the recession. The consolidation, in conjunction with 
international pressure for transparency, is reshaping the look and character 
of the Swiss private banking industry.  
To start, FATCA is costly for Swiss banks. The Swiss Banking 
Association has estimated the implementation costs for FATCA to be 
around CHF 200-300 million.169 This is on top of the hefty settlement cost 
many banks are enduring for U.S. criminal investigations for facilitating tax 
evasion. At the same time, declined margins have now become the norm for 
Swiss banks since the recession.170 The decline is attributed to relatively flat 
new money, low performance of assets under management, and elevated 
competitive and regulatory pressures.171 According to a September 2014 
study of Swiss private banks, KPMG found that one-third of Swiss private 
banks in its study were in continuing decline, while two-thirds of these 
banks posted negative returns in 2013.172 The number of these banks 
reporting losses increased more than 50% from 2012 to 2013.173 Further, the 
banks in the study that paid for U.S. tax evasion fines and related costs saw 
their return on investment decline by negative 8.2 percentage points in 
2013.174 These changes undoubtedly impact the Swiss economy, where the 
banking sector alone accounts for CHF 35 billion of added value, or 6% of 
the overall economy.175 
As a result, bank consolidation has become a real phenomenon in 
Switzerland.176 KPMG found that January to July 2014 saw M&A activity 
 
 169 SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 16 (citing 
Von Armando Mombelli, Die USA schlagen eine tiefe Presche ins Bankgeheimnis [The US Rips a Big 
Tear Into Banking Secrecy], SWISSINFO.CH (Ger.), June 30, 2014, available at 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/die-usa-schlagen-eine-tiefe-bresche-ins-bankgeheimnis/38839962. 
Additionally, complying with OECD’s automatic exchange of information regime is expected to cost 
Swiss banks another CHF 300-600 million. Id. (citing Manfred Rist, Neue steuerliche Realitäten [New 
Tax Realities], NEUE ZÜRICHER ZEITUNG (Ger.), July 21, 2014, available at 
http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/neue-steuerliche-realitaeten-1.18347906 .  
 170 See KPMG, CLARITY ON PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS 5 (2014), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/CH/en/topics/Pages/performance-swiss-private-banks.aspx [hereinafter 
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS].  
 171 Id. at 5.  
 172 Id. at 6, 12. 
 173 Id. at 8 (finding that 23 banks reported losses in 2012, and 34 banks in 2013).  
 174 Id. at 41 (noting that these banks represented only one-fifth of all Swiss private banks, so many 
more are likely exposed in the coming years). See also supra note 80 and accompanying text (stating 
that more than 106 Swiss banks have voluntarily come forward as of January 2014). 
 175 The Economic Importance of the Swiss Financial Centre, SWISS BANKING, 
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/facts_figures.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).  
 176 Swiss private banking business has been going through a fundamental change and facing a 
number of challenges, namely increased regulation, consolidation, and declining margins. See DELOITTE 
WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTER RANKING 2013, supra note 22; PwC, THE END OF A GOLDEN AGE? 
PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY (2013), available at http://www.pwc.ch/user_content/editor/files/publ_ 
adv/pwc_private_banking_study_2013_e.pdf [hereinafter PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY]; SWISS 
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involving almost 10% of the Swiss private banks in its study, involving 
around CHF 125 billion in assets under management.177 Smaller Swiss 
banks that are more pessimistic about future outlook have been particularly 
affected by cross-border regulatory developments and decline in 
profitability, and thus driven into consolidation.178 So while small and 
medium-sized banks have suffered outflows of assets under management (at 
the end of 2013, small banks represented 61.7% of KPMG’s sample but 
only 7.8% of total assets under management), large banks have won market 
share (from 59% in 2008 to 78% in 2013).179 This is in line with the number 
of banks in Switzerland dropping from 338 in 2005 to 283 in 2013, a 16% 
decline.180  
Since the enactment of FATCA, the pressure for transparency has 
impacted the prominent market niche that Switzerland occupied in secret 
private banking.181 Most private Swiss banks direct their core efforts on 
private banking, exclusively courting high net-worth individuals182 and 
focusing on asset management.183 They do not solicit funds from the public, 
and do not make loans and investments.184 Private banking is the most 
important revenue source for Swiss banks, managing CHF 3.1 billion in 
assets and generating gross revenue of 26.5 billion in 2013.185 Since 2007, 
Swiss banks have seen a marked downturn in revenue due to a decline in 
client assets and increased competition from service providers in clients’ 
countries of origin, since previous untaxed offshore assets are now 
 
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND: STATUS REPORT AND TRENDS 
(2011), available at http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20110107-bro-vermoegensverwaltungsgeschaeft-
rva.pdf. Still, pressure for consolidation remains high for the future. See PERFORMANCE OF SWISS 
PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 170 at 19. 
 177 PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 170 at 19, 20. 
 178 KPMG, DEFINING THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SWISS BANKING 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.ifb.unisg.ch/en/Dienste/~/media/Internet/Content/Dateien/InstituteUndCenters/IfB/Services/
Forschungsstudien/Def%20the%20Future%20of%20Swiss%20Private%20Banking2010.ashx. See also 
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 172, at 28. 
 179 PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 172, at 31.  
 180 SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 2014 BANKING BAROMETER: ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE SWISS 
BANKING INDUSTRY 7 (2014), available at http://www.swissbanking.org/en/2014_bankenbarometer 
_en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 BANKING BAROMETER]. 
 181 Swiss banks believe that tax transparency places a huge burden on the Swiss financial industry. 
See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 11. With FATCA and other automatic exchange of 
information systems on the rise, the euphoria of 2010 when the financial industry proposed anonymous 
withholding tax has “evaporated.” Id. For a comparison of anonymous withholding versus automatic 
exchange of information, see supra Part IV.A. For a discussion on automatic exchange of information as 
a new global trend, see infra Part V.  
 182 See KPMG SWITZ. & UNIV. OF ST. GALLEN, supra note 49, at 6, 7.  
 183 2014 BANKING BAROMETER, supra note 182, at 6. 
 184 See Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, Private Banking Is Alive and Well in Switzerland, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230390240457915143388691 
3804.  
 185 SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 19. 
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regulated.186 Singapore and Hong Kong are likely to benefit from the 
increasing transparency in Switzerland, and they are quickly catching up to 
Switzerland’s status as the top center for wealth management.187 Because of 
the competition,188 Swiss banks have been evaluating new business 
opportunities, adjusting their footprint in the global banking industry, and 
leveraging potential that have not been exhausted.189  
As a result of regulatory developments and increased competition, 
private banking in Switzerland is experiencing a change in customer base 
with a rise in assets from emerging markets. Foreign clients are important 
for Swiss banks: as of end of 2013, 51.3% of the CHF 6.1 trillion (about 
$3.1 trillion) assets managed in Switzerland were from foreign clients.190 
While almost half of the foreign assets under management in 2010 were 
from Western Europe and North America, about 55% of foreign assets were 
from emerging countries in 2013.191 Thus, growth regions such as the 
Middle East, Latin America, and Asia are increasingly important for Swiss 
private banking.192 On the other hand, assets from Western Europe and the 
U.S. declined due to FATCA and the resulting taxation of assets; Swiss 
banks’ business with the most affluent customers was most impacted by this 
change.193 The transformation in customer base goes hand in hand with 
decrease in profitability, even though the reduction in affluent customers is 
partly compensated with inflow of new customers with lower margins.194  
In sum, the burden of FATCA has not only affected the economics of 
the Swiss banking industry, but it is also altering the look and character of 
Swiss private banking. 
 IV. FATCA’S IMPACT ON SWITZERLAND IN CONTEXT OF 
RECENT INTERNATIONAL TRENDS 
As a final point, this section will highlight how FATCA’s impact on 
 
 186 See PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY, supra note 178, at 6. Additionally, price competition has 
intensified in the Swiss private banking industry, which further pressurizes margins. Id. As a result, the 
banks’ average income per employee reduced by 40%, from CHF 656,000 in 2007 to CHF 395,000 in 
2011. Id. 
 187 DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTER RANKING 2013, supra note 22, at 24; see also 2014 
BANKING BAROMETER, supra note 182, at 21. 
 188 Survey shows that Swiss banks believe that private banking is a business area where the 
competition is especially fierce. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 21.  
 189 See also AMMANN ET AL., BOOZE & CO., THE FUTURE OF SWISS OFFSHORE PRIVATE BANKING 
16–18 (2011), available at http://www.booz.com/media/file/BoozCo-Swiss-Offshore-Private-Banking-
Abgeltungssteuer-Abkommen.pdf; PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 171, at 18. 
 190 SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 20. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id.  
 193 Id. Further decline in assets from developed countries is expected for future years. Id. at 22.  
 194 Id. at 22–23. 
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Switzerland is further bolstered by recent international trends moving 
toward greater cross-border financial transparency. Automatic exchange of 
information has become the standard around the world, and various 
international regimes based on IGA Model I are being set up to this effect. 
So while FATCA is not an end-all legislation for combating tax 
avoidance,195 it certainly drives the current global movement for automatic 
exchange of information, and complements a number of international 
initiatives that crack down on tax evasion. 
First, automatic exchange of information has become the global 
norm.196 During the 2013 G20 Summit in St. Petersburg, world leaders 
endorsed automatic exchange of information as the new global tax 
standard.197 The G20 Leaders’ Declaration announced a plan to begin to 
exchange information automatically on tax matters among G20 members by 
the end of 2015.198 Consequently, the OECD in July 2014 announced the 
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters 
(the Standard), a single global standard for an automatic exchange of 
information between authorities worldwide.199 The Standard contains a 
Model Competent Authority Agreement (Model CAA) and the Common 
Reporting Due Diligence Standard (CRS), which are similar to and were 
built off IGA Model I.200  
Following the release of the Standard, the European Commission in 
October 2014 agreed on a draft directive to implement the new Standard in 
the EU beginning 2017.201 Also in October 2014, 51 jurisdictions signed the 
 
 195 One of the biggest issues that commentators have with FATCA is that it is largely unilateral in 
U.S. banks’ favor and only adversely affects non-U.S. financial institutions. See also supra note 85. 
 196 Indeed, a recent survey even revealed that Swiss banks have also accepted the automatic 
exchange of information as the new global standard. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 19 (finding 
that about half of the banks surveyed believe that automatic exchange of information will become the 
new international standard by 2020).  
 197 See OECD, G20 LEADERS’ DECLARATION: SAINT PETERSBURG SUMMIT 13 (2013), available at 
https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.pdf.; OECD, TAX 
ANNEX TO THE ST. PETERSBURG G20 LEADERS’ DECLARATION 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/saint-petersburg/Tax-Annex-St-Petersburg-G20-Leaders-
Declaration.pdf [hereinafter TAX ANNEX]. 
 198 See TAX ANNEX, supra note 199, at 3. 
 199 See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS (2014), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/ 
oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-
matters_9789264216525-en#page1. 
 200 See BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 149, at 5–6. See also OECD, A STEP 
CHANGE IN TAX TRANSPARENCY: OECD REPORT FOR THE G8 SUMMIT 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxtransparency_G8report.pdf. 
 201 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Combating Tax Evasion: Council Agrees to 
Extend Automatic Exchange of Information (Oct. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/145103.pdf; see also 
Memorandum, Council of the European Union, Automatic Exchange of Information: Frequently Asked 
Questions (Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-591_en.htm.  
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first Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Information to automatically exchange information under the 
Standard, with Switzerland joining in a month later.202 The competent 
authority agreement lays out details of what information will be exchanged 
at what time.203 Further, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes, which includes more than 120 countries 
and jurisdictions, has received commitments from over 80 of its members to 
implement the new Standard within specific timeframes.204  
Finally, implementation of FATCA aligns with the current 
international mood against tax avoidance. OECD’s Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), endorsed by G20 leaders in July 
2013,205 has been hailed as the ultimate constructive move to reform 
international taxation policies for multinational enterprises. The BEPS 
report recommends 15 specific actions to prevent international tax 
avoidance by multinational companies with aggressive tax positions and 
lays out a time line for swift implementation of its policies.206 Further, 
Switzerland’s neighbors are also coming down on tax avoidance. For 
example, U.K.’s General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) came into effect in July 
2013 to better define abusive tax arrangements.207 Luxembourg, another 
country notoriously known as a safe haven for secret accounts, revealed that 
it will begin an automatic exchange of tax data with almost all of EU 
 
 202 See Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-
tax-information/multilateral-competent-authority-agreement.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). The 
multilateral competent authority agreement is based on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, as amended by the 2010 Protocol. See OECD, THE 
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS: AMENDED 
BY THE 2010 PROTOCOL (2011), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/the-multilateral-convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-
matters_9789264115606-en#page1. Switzerland joined the multilateral authority agreement on Nov. 19, 
2014. Press Release, Swiss Federal Administration, Switzerland Takes Further Step Towards 
Introduction of Automatic Exchange of Information (Nov. 19, 2014), available at 
https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=55327. 
 203 See Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, supra note 204. 
 204 Joint Statement by the Early Adopters Group (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/AEOI-early-adopters-statement.pdf; OECD, 
GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: 
STATEMENT OF OUTCOMES (2014), available at 
 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/statement-of-outcomes-gfberlin.pdf. 
 205 See TAX ANNEX, supra note 199, at 3. 
 206 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en; David Zeiler, Corporate Tax Avoidance in the Crosshairs 
of OECD Plan, MONEY MORNING, Jul. 15, 2013, http://moneymorning.com/2013/07/15/corporate-tax-
avoidance-in-the-crosshairs-of-oecd-plan/. 
 207 See Finance Act, 2013, c. 29, §§ 206–215 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/29/contents/enacted/data.htm; HM Revenue & Customs, The 
General Anti-Abuse Rule, HMRC.GOV.UK (last visited Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ 
avoidance/gaar.htm. 
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member nations beginning on January 1, 2015.208  
To conclude, various international agreements and plans in the 
pipeline indicate a general movement toward greater taxing transparency, 
particularly in regards to automatic exchange of information. This will 
further cement the lasting impact that FATCA has on the Swiss banking 
industry. 
 CONCLUSION 
With FATCA enforcement beginning in 2014 against a backdrop of 
greater international scrutiny for transparency, one can expect to see great 
changes in the Swiss banking industry. Switzerland’s participation in U.S. 
and international regimes for greater exchange of information has lead way 
to an unprecedented amount of disclosure, assistance, and cooperation by 
Swiss banks. Throughout this process, there has been a full-fledged debate 
in Switzerland: is moving toward transparency a betrayal of Swiss values as 
a disinterested Alpine nation, or is Switzerland ready for a fundamental 
shift in its belief in privacy?209 The answer to this debate seems to lean on 
the latter, but moving forward, the debate will certainly shape Switzerland’s 
historical and cultural identification with neutrality, privacy, and 
independence.210 Swiss banks are hopefully optimistic through the tough 
conditions211 – in the short term, Switzerland is still expected to remain as 
the largest single offshore center, with about 25% of total offshore wealth 
by the end of 2017.212 Yet, in this new era of tax and banking transparency, 
how Switzerland’s reputation will change in the long term remains to be 
seen.  
 
 208 See FAQ: Introducing automatic exchange of information in Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG 
MINISTRY OF FIN. (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.mf.public.lu/actualites/2013 
/04/faq_aut_exchange_1004131/index.html; Stephanie Bodoni & Rebecca Christie, Luxembourg to Ease 
Bank Secrecy Rule, Share Data in 2015, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 10, 2013, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/luxembourg-to-ease-bank-secrecy-rule-share-data-in-
2015.html. 
 209 See Emma Thomasson, Special Report: the Battle for the Swiss Soul, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/us-swiss-banks-specialreport-idUSBRE93H07620130418. 
While Conservative politician Christoph Darbellay publicly called Wegelin executives “traitors” that 
dragged Swiss finance through the dirt, Josef Ackermann, the chairman of Zurich Insurance, called on 
Switzerland to resist international attacks. Id.  
 210 See Kim Hjelmgaard, Secret’s Out on the Swiss Bank Account, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/22/swiss-banking-secrecy/4390231/ (noting that in 
response to the stable society and well-developed banking industry, the Swiss ended up developing 
concealment as a cornerstone of the country’s cultural identity); Kurapovna, supra note 186 (“the Swiss 
sense of privacy and independence—ingrained over so many centuries of remaining neutral while 
surrounded by teetering monarchies, a hostile Wehrmacht next door and nestled close to half a continent 
under communist control—is not about to wither away so easily.”). 
 211 See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 11.  
 212 BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 5, at 12. 
